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INTRODUCTION
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Delegate John Dickinson of
Delaware raised two questions that, in Madison's notes at least, met with an un-
comfortable silence: "What is the extent of the term 'disability' & who is to be
the judge of it?"' Dickinson was referring to what became the Presidential Suc-
cession Clause in Article II.2 Debate on this provision was immediately post-
poned, and Dickinson's prescient questions went unanswered for almost two
centuries. In 1967, a new generation of constitutional authors answered his sec-
ond question in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment (the "Amendment"), which
gives two sets of constitutional actors the power to declare presidential inability.
Section 3 makes the President judge of his own inability:
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written dec-
laration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his of-
fice, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the con-
trary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President
as Acting President.3
In the event the President is unable or unwilling to declare himself unable, Sec-
tion 4 gives that power to the Vice President and Cabinet with Congress as the
court of appeal:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal of-
ficers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Sen-
ate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written decla-
ration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.4
1. James Madison, Journal (Aug. 27, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 427 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966), available
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/debates_827.asp.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § i, cl. 6 ("In case of the removal of the President from office,
or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by
law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President,
and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a Presi-
dent shall be elected."), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 3-4; U.S. CONST.
amend. XXV.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
4. Id. § 4.
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Section 4 makes Congress a court of appeal when the President disputes his
subordinates' declaration of presidential inability.5 Without a two-thirds vote of
both Houses, the President regains his office.
No authority ever has directly and authoritatively answered Dickinson's
first question-What is presidential inability? No matter which set of constitu-
tional actors judges inability, the concept itself remains vague. In both cases, the
Amendment describes presidential inability as the President's being "unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office." 6 That phrase is never defined,
and the Constitution offers no measure of physical debility, mental infirmity, or
emotional instability that would satisfy it.7 The framers of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment intentionally declined to provide a clear constitutional rule in re-
sponse to Dickinson's first question, but the structure and context of the
Amendment they crafted and the legislative history they wrote in the process
suggest two separate categories of presidential inability.
Previous expositors of the "unable to discharge" phrase have erroneously
assumed that it has the same meaning whether invoked by the President or his
subordinates! In spite of the traditional presumption that identical phrases
have the same meaning,9 a careful reading of the Presidential Inability Clauses
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, informed by constitutional structure and
confirmed by legislative and application history, demands different construc-
tions of the formally identical "unable to discharge" phrases. The President en-
joys absolute discretion in construing the inability provision of Section 3: Struc-
ture demands, and history confirms, that as long as the President is able to
make a rational decision to yield temporarily the powers of his office to the Vice
President, he may do so no matter what underlying condition or circumstance
5. Id.
6. Id. §§ 3-4. Actually, the same phrase is used four times: once in Section 3 as the
standard for the President's voluntary determination, twice in Section 4 as the
standard for the Vice President's and Cabinet's determination, and yet again in
Section 4 as the standard for Congress's determination in the event of a dispute
between the President and his Vice President and Cabinet as to the President's
ability. This Note treats all three instances of the phrase in Section 4 as equivalent
since Congress is "decid[ing] the issue" of the initial diagnosis by the Vice Presi-
dent and the Cabinet and is thus bound by the same standard. See infra note 188.
7. Indeed, it would have been impossible to establish a comprehensive medical
scheme, much less a constitutional scheme, for evaluating the full array of physi-
cal, mental, and emotional impairments that may render a President unable to
discharge his duties. See 111 CONG. REc. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler);
David A. Drachman et al., Subcommittee Report: Criteria for Disability and Im-
pairment, in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY: PAPERS, DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ISSUES OF INABILITY AND
DISABILITY AMONG PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 276, 278 (James F. Toole
& Robert J. Joynt eds., 2001) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY].
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. See infra Part V.
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provokes that action."° Section 4, by contrast, demands a much narrower con-
struction of its inability provision by the Vice President and Cabinet: Section 4
is only available when the President is so severely impaired that he is unable to
make or communicate a rational decision to step down temporarily of his own
accord." Thus, although the linguistic overlap of the two inability phrases is
complete, each phrase encompasses only disabilities that would not qualify un-
der the other. 2 To counteract the prevailing confusion about presidential in-
ability and the attendant risk that self-diagnoses under Section 3 will pave the
way for permissive invocations of Section 4, Congress and the executive branch
should clarify the distinct circumstances in which applications of each section
are appropriate.' 3
I. THE PRESIDENCY IN JEOPARDY
The present state of scholarly opinion on the meaning of Sections 3 and 4 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment endangers the presidency because of its simplistic
understanding of presidential inability. Since the "unable to discharge" phrase
has the same semantic content in each section, its interpreters have assumed
that the phrase is univocal, that it admits of only one legal meaning. If this were
so, any legitimate construction of presidential inability in one section could ap-
ply to the other, and the history of presidential applications of Section 3 for mi-
nor, short-term impairments would create dangerous precedent that an ambi-
tious Vice President and misguided Cabinet could use to oust the President
under Section 4 for a critical period, or even permanently with the cooperation
of Congress.' 4
10. See infra Sections II.A, II.D; Part III.
11. See infra Sections II.C-D; Part III.
12. See E-mail from John D. Feerick, Norris Professor of Law, Fordham Law Sch., to
author (Apr. 11, 2008, 15:35 EST) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review, re-
printed with permission) ("These sections serve different purposes so that what
would be permitted use under Section 3 might not be appropriate at all under the
language of Section 4.... [S]imilar expressions in the Constitution may have dif-
ferent interpretations depending on the context."). John Feerick was at the "nu-
cleus" of a twelve-lawyer conference of the American Bar Association whose rec-
ommendation in 1964 to the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments led ultimately to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCES-
SION 46, 49 (1968).
13. See infra Conclusion.
14. The risk this Note addresses is not that courts will misconstrue the Amendment,
but rather that the Vice President, Cabinet, and Congress will misinterpret the
President's absolute power to diagnose his own inability as an invitation to unseat
the President under similar conditions using the identical language in Section 4.
The political question doctrine should prevent a court from interfering in any ap-
plication of either Section 3 or Section 4. See iii CONG. REC. 15,588 (1965) (state-
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A. Univocal Constructions of Presidential Inability
The mistaken notion that the "unable to discharge" phrases in Sections 3
and 4 must be subject to the same construction has existed from the beginning.
The Amendment's opponents in Congress warned that Section 4 would transfer
too much executive power to the Vice President and Cabinet, risking a coup
d'6tat in the White House. 5 Even proponents of the Amendment failed to dis-
tinguish explicitly between the "unable to discharge" phrases in Sections 3 and
4, although their section-specific definitions and hypothetical applications con-
firm that different constructions must apply in each section. 6 Instead, the
Amendment's sponsors defended Section 4 with reference to the history of def-
erential Vice Presidents. 7
Neither of the two major scholarly commissions on the Amendment sug-
gested distinct constructions of the two "unable to discharge" phrases. The 1988
Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment (the "Commission") advised routine use of Section 3 for even
"borderline cases" of transitory inability," and restraint in application of Sec-
tion 4; however, the Commission never offered a constitutional justification for
ment of Sen. Ervin). Both sections involve "a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
(declining to interfere in the Senate's conviction of a federal judge because the
Constitution gives the Senate the sole power to try impeachments and leaves evi-
dentiary and procedural rules to that body).
15. Representative Henry B. Gonzilez voted against the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
and repeatedly sought to repeal it. See Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States To Repeal the 25th Amendment to the
Constitution, H.R.J. Res. 307, 103d Cong. (1994). His concern stemmed in part
from the Amendment's failure to define presidential inability and the related risk
that "a President might be wrongfully or mistakenly removed from office...." 120
CONG. REC. 32,803 (1974) (statement of Rep. Gonzilez) (citation omitted). Similar
fears slowed ratification in Colorado. See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 111-12 (1992).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See iii CONG. REC. 3284 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 7941 (statement of
Rep. Poff); cf infra note 21 (arguing that this is an unstable defense of Section 4,
because the Amendment shifted power to the Vice President).
18. REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT (hereinafter MILLER CENTER REPORT], in 1 PA-
PERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 147,
168-71 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1988) [hereinafter PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY]. The Commission recommended "almost automatic[]" invocation of
Section 3 for up to forty-eight hours after any use of general anesthetic, id., but
the drugs then in use had longer-lasting effects than some modern anesthesia
medications. See infra text accompanying note 156.
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this distinction or suggested that the Vice President and Cabinet are actually
more limited in their construction of the phrase "unable to discharge" than the
President is. The Commission dismissed the concern that a President's liberal
use of Section 3 would encourage power grabs by broadening the definition of
presidential inability in Section 4: "[Tihe fear of a coup by a vice president is
based on a false analogy with other political systems. Historically the defects of
the American vice presidency have not been the temptation to seize power but
the refusal to accept power inherent in the office."' 9 However, the historical ex-
amples of vice-presidential modesty the Commission cites occurred before the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, and each Vice President had his own context-
dependent reason for restraint."0 Moreover, the office of the Vice President has
acquired considerable political power since Vice President Thomas Marshall al-
lowed the First Lady to govern in sick President Woodrow Wilson's stead. In-
deed, the rate of expansion of vice-presidential power has increased because of
the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.2 The Miller Center Commission
19. MILLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 18, at 171.
20. Vice President Chester Arthur could hardly have seized power from President
James Garfield on his deathbed given the embarrassing circumstances of the tran-
sition: Garfield's shooter had shouted "I am a Stalwart of the Stalwarts .... Ar-
thur is president now!" GEORGE FREDERICK HOWE, CHESTER A. ARTHUR: A
QUARTER-CENTURY OF MACHINE POLITICS 149 (photo. reprint 1957) (1935) (cita-
tion omitted). Vice President Thomas Marshall's refusal to take power as Acting
President during President Wilson's incapacity is explicable given his fear of
crossing Mrs. Wilson and the President's other protectors, especially since Presi-
dent Wilson forced Secretary of State Robert Lansing to resign for calling Cabinet
meetings during Wilson's illness and suggesting that Marshall should assume the
President's powers and duties. See S. REP. No. 89-66, at 7 (1965) (Comm. Rep.),
reprinted in STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., APPLICATION
OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO VACANCIES IN THE OFFICE OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT 417, 422-23 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter APPLICATION]; JOHN D.
FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 175-77
(1965). Vice President Richard Nixon was prudent to avoid seizing power after
President Dwight Eisenhower's heart attack, given Nixon's political ambition,
popularity, and relative youth. See EARL MAZO, RICHARD NIXON: A POLITICAL
AND PERSONAL PORTRAIT 188 (1959) (describing President Eisenhower's approval
of Nixon's good judgment after Eisenhower's heart attack); id. at 191 (suggesting
that Nixon's understated management of the White House in Eisenhower's ab-
sence was politically motivated).
21. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The
Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY
AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 165, 167 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000)
[hereinafter MANAGING CRISIS]; Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78
TEMP. L. REv. 811, 837, 859 (2005) (claiming that the Twentieth, Twenty-Second,
and Twenty-Fifth Amendments "strengthened the office [of the Vice President]
and ha[ve] driven the steady emergence of the office into its present structure and
identity"). Senator Bayh admitted this history of vice-presidential submissiveness
might have been different had the Vice President had a clear constitutional
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ignored this evolving power dynamic. The proposals of the 1995 Working
Group on Presidential Disability also failed to articulate a difference between
legitimate constructions of Sections 3 and 4, though they did distinguish im-
pairment (a medical judgment) from presidential inability (a political judg-
ment).22 A Subcommittee on Disability and Impairment listed "[c] onditions in-
variably producing complete incapacitation" that should trigger automatic
consideration of either Section 3 or Section 4,23 but did not distinguish between
the types of inability proper to each section.
Many scholars independently have proposed guidelines for diagnosing
presidential inability, but none has suggested that the "unable to discharge"
phrase is subject to different constructions in Sections 3 and 4. Instead they
have struggled to give it a single meaning that makes sense in both sections. Be-
cause they equate the two standards, some proposals would allow the Vice
President to invoke Section 4 in circumstances where the legislative history of
the Amendment expressly rejects its application, and which are inconsistent
with constitutional structure. Herbert Abrams opines that "Section 4 may be
utilized" any time the President fails to invoke Section 3 before undergoing gen-
eral anesthesia, even for "[p lanned, minor surgical procedures. 2 4 He also
would allow the Vice President and Cabinet to oust a terminally ill President
mechanism for taking control from the President. The Problem of Presidential In-
ability and Filling of Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 1 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 20 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) [hereinafter Hearing
on S.1. Res. I.
22. PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 7, at 531; see also Francis I. Kittredge, Jr. et
al., Subcommittee Report: Investigating Advantages and Disadvantages of Formal-
ized, Standardized Contingency Plans for Administrations in Cases of Disability, in
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra, at 192, 193.
23. PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 7, at 278-80. Two subcommittee members
expressed reservations about pre-judging any medical condition as an automatic
case for invoking Section 4, pointing out that even some of the conditions listed as
"invariably producing complete incapacitation," such as a compound fracture or
dementia, would require political judgment as well as medical judgment. Herbert
L. Abrams et al., Panel Discussion, in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra, at 283, 288
(statement of Dr. Jerry M. Wiener); id. at 290 (statement of Prof. Frank B. Wood).
24. Compare HERBERT L. ABRAMS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT: CONFUSION,
DISABILITY, AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RONALD REAGAN 222-23, 226 (1992) [hereinafter
ABRAMS, PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT], and Herbert L. Abrams, The Vulnerable
President and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, with Observations on Guidelines, a
Health Commission, and the Role of the President's Physician, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 453, 464 (1995) [hereinafter Abrams, Vulnerable President], with Ill CONG.
REC. 15,381 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("We are not talking about the kind of
inability in which the President went to the dentist and was under anesthesia.").
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who was not otherwise incapacitated. 5 Both possibilities contradict the legisla-
tive history and structure of the Amendment 6 but follow naturally from a uni-
vocal construction of the "unable to discharge" phrases: If a President may de-
clare himself "unable" under Section 3 for a colonoscopy, 7 and if that phrase
has the same meaning in both sections, then the Vice President and Cabinet
may declare the President "unable" during the same procedure under Section 4.
Other scholars, starting from the same mistaken presumption of univocal-
ity but wary of endangering the presidency, would apply the strict standard for
inability under Section 4 to both sections. These scholars caution against liberal
use of Section 3 by the President for fear that such applications would create
dangerous precedent for declaring inability under Section 4." In an article ad-
vocating this watered-down approach to Section 3, Scott Gant states the univo-
cal presumption explicitly:
[T]he inability provisions of Sections 3 and 4 have the same meaning as
one another .... [Ilt seems apparent that circumstances enabling a
President to invoke Section 3 would also permit the Vice President and
the cabinet to employ Section 4. After all, the two provisions use iden-
tical language to describe the condition prompting the transfer of
power from the President to the Vice President. 9
Imposing the narrow standard of Section 4 inability upon the President's dis-
cretionary Section 3 power, however, may be as damaging as the reverse alterna-
25. Compare ABRAMS, PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT, supra note 24, at 226, and
Abrams, Vulnerable President, supra note 24, at 464, with III CONG. REC. 15,381
(1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (agreeing that Section 4 is limited to cases of "to-
tal disability").
26. See infra Sections II.C, III.A.
27. See infra Section IV.A.
28. See Scott E. Gant, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's Unex-
plored Removal Provisions, 1999 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 791, 802
("[Mly chief concern is that expansive constructions and applications of Section 3
would facilitate the use of Section 4 to redress perceived personal or political in-
abilities of a President."); see also Robert E. Gilbert, The Genius of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment: Guarding Against Presidential Disability but Safeguarding the Presi-
dency, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 21, at 25, 46 ("Routine invocation of Sec-
tion 3 would.., trivialize the Amendment."); Alexander M. Bickel, The Constitu-
tional Tangle, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14, 15 (stating incorrectly "[t]hat the
25th Amendment applies only to physical disability" and remarking that "the
amendment would be a dangerous instrument indeed if it were otherwise").
29. Gant, supra note 28, at 802.
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tive.3 ° Just such a misunderstanding of the meaning of Section 3 inability led
President Reagan to disclaim its application to "brief and temporary periods of
incapacity" instead of explicitly invoking it at the first occasion.3' This approach
undermines the purpose of Section 3-to promote continuity in the executive
branch by encouraging the President to declare temporary inability even for
short periods.32 By failing to approach presidential inability with a nuanced the-
ory of constitutional construction, each of these scholars has promoted either
unhealthy avoidance of Section 3 or cavalier exploitation of Section 4.
B. The Inadequate Remedy of Congressional Review
Some scholars protest that even if the Vice President and Cabinet were to
import a broad construction of "unable to discharge" from Section 3 into Sec-
tion 4, the congressional check built into Section 4 would prevent any mis-
chief.33 This theory assumes incorrectly that since more members of Congress
are needed to affirm a President's suspension under Section 4 than to impeach
and convict him under Article II, Section 4, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is
necessarily more protective of presidential power than the impeachment proc-
ess is. 34 While it is true that the double supermajority requirement of Section 4
protects the President more than the Article II impeachment and conviction
process does, which requires only a majority of the House of Representatives,35
this procedural hurdle is only one of several factors that make Section 4 differ-
ent from impeachment. The double supermajority requirement does not elimi-
nate the risk that a singular construction of the "unable to discharge" phrases
creates.
3o. Abrams seems to make both mistakes, imposing too broad a standard on Section
4 and too narrow a standard on Section 3. See ABRAMS, PRESIDENT HAS BEEN
SHOT, supra note 24, at 225 (limiting Section 3 to "circumstances in which the
president's ability to make or communicate rational decisions has been compro-
mised").
31. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Section II.B.
33. See Michael Nelson, Background Paper, in A HEARTBEAT AWAY: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 19, 90 (1988).
34. See Birch E. Bayh, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its History and Meaning
[hereinafter Bayh, History and Meaning], in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABIL-
ITY, supra note 18, at 1, 11 ("[I]t is more difficult to declare a president disabled
[under Section 41 than it is to impeach him .... ").
35. See ill CONG. REC. 3256 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("That is more protection
than is given to a President in the event of impeachment."). Compare U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (giving "the sole Power of Impeachment" to the House), with id. art. I,
§ 3 (giving "the sole Power to try all Impeachments" to the Senate, but requiring
"the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present" to convict).
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First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Article II impeachment exist to
remedy different presidential defects, so not every President separated from his
powers by Section 4 could also be impeached and convicted36 Unlike in an im-
peachment proceeding, Section 4 does not require Congress to find the Presi-
dent guilty of wrongdoing to find him "unable to discharge the powers and du-
ties of his office." 37 Thus, if the Vice President, Cabinet, and Congress equate
Section 4 inability with the flexible standard of Section 3, an unpopular Presi-
dent who has committed no crime is at greater risk of Congressional removal
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment than Article II impeachment, in spite of
the double supermajority required by the former.
Second, Congress may be more likely to affirm the President's inability un-
der the Twenty-Fifth Amendment than to impeach him under Article II be-
cause a finding of Section 4 inability is not necessarily permanent. While re-
moval by impeachment is final, the President may appeal a declaration of
Section 4 inability an unlimited number of times. 3' This difference may make
inability seem to Congress less severe than impeachment. The distinction may
be illusory, however, because Congress is unlikely to reinstate a President whom
the executive and legislative branches have already declared incapable of serving
in that office.39
Third, the damage of an improper declaration of inability under Section 4
is immediate. Unlike removal by impeachment and conviction, which takes ef-
fect only after both houses of Congress have voted against the President, re-
moval by Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment occurs before Congress
even enters the scene. Congress only votes on the President's inability after the
Vice President has already become Acting President, the President has transmit-
ted "his written declaration that no inability exists," and the Vice President and
Cabinet have transmitted a second declaration to the contrary.4° Moreover, the
Vice President and Cabinet are allowed four days from the time of the Presi-
36. See Paul B. Stephan III, History, Background and Outstanding Problems of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, in PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 18,
at 63, 67-68.
37. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President... shall be removed from Office
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
38. See Presidential Inability: Hearings on H.R. 836 et a!. Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 94, 101 (1965) (hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 836] (statements
of Sen. Bayh and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
39. See id. at 94 (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7949 (1965) (state-
ment of Rep. Moore) (opposing H.J. Res. 1 because it would put a President re-
moved under Section 4 "in a position of coming here to the Congress and trying
to lobby himself back into the job to which the people have elected him").
40. See Stephan, supra note 36, at 68.
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dent's appeal to decide whether to transmit their second declaration. 4' Thus, the
Acting President can enjoy at least four days of presidential power-four days
to advance his own policy goals, to prove himself a capable executive, and to ac-
climate Congress and the public to his presence in the Oval Office. By the time
Congress is allowed to vote, the deck may already be stacked against the Presi-
dent: The appellate posture of the case before Congress, doubts cast on the
President's ability, popular interim leadership by the Acting President, and re-
luctance to upset the status quo again would all work in the Vice President's fa-
vor.
Finally, even if congressional action (or inaction) ultimately restores the
President to his office, the four-day period-up to twenty-seven days if Con-
gress is slow to assemble and cannot reach a decision4 -- may be enough for the
Acting President to accomplish whatever goals led him to challenge the Presi-
dent's ability in the first place. Thus, the existence of legislative review is an in-
sufficient protection against the risks of a univocal interpretation of presidential
inability in Sections 3 and 4.
II. STRUCTURE
Because both inability provisions have the same text, any difference in
meaning between them must originate outside the semantic content of the
words themselves. Constitutional structure is one source of that meaning. The
structure of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment-and of the constitutional presi-
dency generally-requires the President and his subordinates to construct the
inability provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 differently even though they look
41. Gregory Jacob misinterprets Section 4 to allow the President to regain his powers
immediately upon transmitting his appeal. Gregory F. Jacob, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 23,
at text following n.12 (2003). Instead, the President regains power "unless the Vice
President and [Cabinet] transmit within four days" their second declaration. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. The drafters of the Amendment left the Vice President
in the saddle during a period of disputed inability, because they wanted to prevent
presidential power from bouncing back and forth between the Vice President and
a President whose capacity to govern had been impugned. See S. REP. No. 89-66,
at 3, in APPLICATION, supra note 20, at 419; Hearing on S.1. Res. 1, supra note 21, at
17-18 (statement of Sen. Bayh); 111 CONG. REC. 3284-85 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Bayh); id. at 7939 (statement of Rep. Celler); id. at 7938. The Vice President may,
however, voluntarily return power to the President in fewer than four days. See
infra note 67.
42. The Vice President has four days in which to transmit his reply to the President's
appeal. After receiving the Vice President's second declaration, Congress must as-
semble within two days. Then Congress has up to twenty-one days to deliberate
"from the time that the Congress convenes" after which the powers and duties of
office automatically revert to the President. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4;
EMANUEL CELLER ET AL., STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE
HousE, H.R. REP. No. 89-564, at 2 (1965) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in APPLICATION,
supra note 20, at 441, 444.
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alike. This difference results from the structure of the executive branch and the
divergence of each section's decisionmakers and procedures. Sections 3 and 4 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment set forth distinct mechanisms for declaring a
president "unable," each fulfilling the Amendment's twin purposes-preserving
executive continuity while protecting the President against politically motivated
challenges to his power. 43 Structure demands that each section deal with a mu-
tually exclusive set of presidential inabilities: Section 3 may apply in any cir-
cumstance as long as the President is able to make and communicate a rational
decision to step down, whereas Section 4 may apply only when the President is
unable to do so.
A. Structure, Meaning, and Constitutional Construction
Constitutional actors derive constitutional meaning in two ways. They dis-
cover it through interpretation, and-when interpretive meaning runs out-
they develop it through construction. 44 The traditional tools of interpretation-
text, history, and structure-clarify some of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's
linguistic ambiguities, but residual vagueness requires the relevant political ac-
tors to construct meaning by applying under-determinate standards to particu-
lar circumstances. 45
43. See S. REP. No. 89-66, in APPLICATION, supra note 20, at 417, 420, 424, 428-30;
Gilbert, supra note 28, at 25 (noting that the "overriding objectives [of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment] are that presidential transitions will be smooth and
orderly and that the powers of the presidency will always reside in a person physi-
cally and mentally capable of exercising them").
44. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 120 (2004) ("The
more general or vague the term (determined historically), the more likely it is that
uncertain applications will arise outside its core meaning. When this occurs, 'in-
terpretation,' strictly speaking, will have run out and the meaning of the text must
be determined rather than found.... [T]he ambit of a vague term is a matter of
'construction' rather than interpretation."); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1, 8
(1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION] ("[Inter-
pretive modalities] such as text and structure, framers' intent, and precedent...
elucidate only a portion of the Constitution's meaning. Additional meaning...
must be constructed from the political melding of the document with external in-
terests and principles.") (citation omitted); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 7 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]
("(The] precondition [of construction] is that parts of the constitutional text have
no discoverable meaning.... The specification of a single governing meaning
from these possibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpretation....
This additional step is the construction of meaning."). For an expansive view of
the Constitution's amenability to construction, see Jack Balkin, Original Meaning
and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 435 (2007).
45. The "unable to discharge" standard is under-determinate in Section 4, because the
Vice President and Cabinet decide whether a given impairment renders the Presi-
27:459 2009
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND SUBJECTIVE MEANING
Interpretation resolves the "unable to discharge" phrase's ambiguity (refer-
ring to mental as well as physical disability), but does not exhaust its capacity
for meaning, because "unable" is not only ambiguous but vague. 46 This consti-
tutional vagueness delegates to the President and his subordinates the power to
construct constitutional meaning around instances of presidential impairment
that the framers could not have anticipated.
47
The Amendment's vagueness does not imply, however, that the Vice Presi-
dent and Cabinet share the President's unbounded discretion to define presi-
dential inability. Constitutional structure, in addition to informing interpreta-
tion of ambiguous language, constrains the construction of practical standards
from vague language. 4' Here, the structure of the executive branch and the re-
view procedures of Section 4 require the Vice President and Cabinet to con-
struct the "unable to discharge" phrase more narrowly than the President, who
subjectively constructs the same phrase in Section 3.49
Since the semantic content of each inability phrase is the same, one might
argue that a difference in procedure rather than meaning accounts for their dif-
ferent operations. But this approach injects a false distinction between meaning
and structure in constitutional law, where structure informs meaning. 50 It also
underestimates the effect present-day constructions of open-ended provisions
dent "unable" based on grounds other than the Amendment's language, yet the
structure of Section 4 limits the range of legitimate applications. In Section 3, the
phrase is indeterminate: It places no limit on the set of circumstances for which
the President may invoke it. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:
Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987).
46. To be precise, the unable to discharge phrase is imprecise in that there is no clear
demarcation between ability and inability; incommensurable in that it is impossi-
ble to calibrate the dimensions of physical and mental ability in a single scale of
ability by which all Presidents, or even one President, may be measured in all cir-
cumstances; and immensurate in that the quality to be diagnosed-physical or
mental ability-resists precise measurement. See TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT,
VAGUENESS IN LAW 33-35, 41-43, 46 (2003).
47. See BARNETT, supra note 44, at 118 ("More often, a vague term is chosen because
drafters realize that the resolution of a future problem will depend on specific fac-
tual circumstances that cannot be specified in advance and therefore must be de-
cided by others."); Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in VAGUENESS IN
NORMATIVE TEXTS 27, 42-43 (Vijay K. Bhatia et al. eds., 2005); sources cited infra
note 93.
48. See BARNETT, supra note 44, at 125 ("Most who engage in constitutional construc-
tion strive to take into account constitutional principles that underlie the text.");
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 44, at io-ii.
49. See infra Sections II.B-D.
50. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (Ox Bow Press 1985) (1969).
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have on future constitutional understanding. 1 Both sections require construc-
tion to derive constitutional meaning from the same vague phrase, but the
structure of each section sets wholly different boundaries on that construction.
B. Section 3: Promoting Continuity Through Non-Reviewable Self-Diagnosis
The procedures and checks in each section of the Amendment mitigate the
risks associated with its respective decisionmaker. The greatest risk associated
with the President's self-diagnosis is that he will cling to power even after he has
lost the ability to wield it responsibly. Thus, Section 3 encourages a President to
declare his own inability with the constitutional promise that he may resume
his powers and duties at any time merely by declaring that his inability has
ended." A Vice President who considers the President's return to power prema-
ture has no recourse except to resort to Section 4 with the cooperation of the
Cabinet.
Section 3 also encourages the President to declare himself temporarily "un-
able" by omitting any external check on that decision. Recognizing that the will
to power is the greatest natural check on abdication, the drafters made the
President's declaration under Section 3 effective with no outside input on the
President's mental or physical state. The President is constitutionally unable
whenever he so declares in writing to the leaders of Congress;" his prerogative
to make that judgment is limited only by his own reading of the Inability Clause
in Section 3 and his own conscience.5 4
51. See Balkin, supra note 44, at 490 ("[C]onstitutional constructions can have path
dependent effects on how the constitutional system operates."). But see WHIT-
TINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 44, at 15 ("Constructions
never leave the realm of politics; they do not become a higher law ... ").
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3; see also S. REP. No. 89-66, in APPLICATION, supra
note 2o, at 3, 419 ("This will reduce the reluctance of the President to utilize the
provisions of [Section 3] in the event he fears it would be difficult for him to re-
gain his powers and duties once he has voluntarily relinquished them."); ill
CONG. REc. 15,378 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); Ill CONG. REc. 7941 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Poff) ("A President would always hesitate to utilize the volun-
tary mechanism if he knew that a challenge could be lodged when he sought to re-
capture his office."); 111 CONG. REc. 7943 (1965) (statement of Rep. Horton); Bayh,
History and Meaning, supra note 34, at 35.
53. See 111 CONG. REC. 7958 (1965) (statement of Rep. White) ("There is no require-
ment that a reason be given other than that the President is 'unable' to act....").
But see FEERICK, supra note 15, at 198 ("Section 3 does not provide a mechanism
for a President to step aside temporarily without justification, thereby neglecting
his duties."). Past invocations of Section 3 have been accompanied by explana-
tions, see infra Section IV.A, but the structure of the Amendment does not require
a justification from the President or forbid temporary abdication short of an im-
peachable abuse of power.
54. See FEERICK, supra note 15, at 198.
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The self-fulfilling and unreviewable nature of Section 3 inability makes any
presidential declaration that complies with its procedure consistent with the
open-ended structure of Section 3. On the other hand, arbitrary declarations
that repeatedly endanger the country could provide grounds for impeachment.
The phrase "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors""5 probably encompasses
non-indictable abuses of power. 6 For an application of Section 3 to rise to the
level of an impeachable offense, though, it would have to endanger the country
gravely and result from clearly corrupt motives. Mere bad judgment in applying
Section 3 is not an impeachable offense, 7 and questionable impeachment cases
stemming from misuse of Section 3 should be resolved in the President's favor.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that impeachable invocations of Section 3 would oc-
cur absent a severe mental impairment that would justify removal under Sec-
tion 4 if the President were to prematurely and irrationally declare his restored
ability. In that case, Section 4 removal would be more expedient than im-
peachment.5' But under ordinary circumstances, the Constitution allows the
President to declare his own inability for any reason-ranging from minor im-
pairment to severe disability, disclosed or undisclosed-without risking im-
peachment for abdication.
Beyond avoiding impeachment, commentators have cautioned that the
President's interest in maintaining his own personal power and the power of his
office should discourage him from any "frivolous invocation of Section 3-as,
for example, when the president undergoes a medical procedure that does not
affect his cognitive functions or his ability to communicate... .19 All things are
lawful, but all things are not expedient.6" The practical wisdom of invoking Sec-
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
56. See STAFF OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 18-20 (1974) [hereinafter IM-
PEACHMENT STAFF REPORT]; RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS 59-67 (1973); CHARLES L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK
37-40 (2d ed. 1998); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-
17, at 294 (2d ed. 1988); John Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the
Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 54-55 (1971).
57. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
58. A President who misused the powers of his office because of insanity would not
even be eligible for impeachment if "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" are under-
stood to have a mens rea requirement. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Chancellor Kent
and the Search for the Elements of Impeachable Offenses, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 91,
122-26 (1998).
59. Gilbert, supra note 28, at 47; see also id. at 46 ("Routine invocation of Section 3
would not only trivialize the Amendment but also damage the president's 'presi-
dentiality' and thereby his ability to lead.").
6o. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Clinton-Obama, Obama-Clinton: How They Could Run
Together and Take Turns Being President, SLATE, Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.slate
.cOm/id/2187034/pagenum/all /(proposing Section 3 as a back-up mechanism for
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tion 3 only in justifiably serious cases, however, should not be confused with a
constitutional requirement of total inability.
Once a President is absolutely unable to make or communicate rational de-
cisions, Section 3 is no longer available to him because it requires his self-
diagnosis and written declaration.6' Thus, the structure of Section 3 requires
that its inability phrase mean something short of total disability. To relinquish
power under Section 3, the President must be capable of making a rational deci-
sion and of transmitting a written document. Beyond that, the structure of Sec-
tion 3 allows the President to invoke it in any circumstance and for any reason,
thereby promoting executive branch continuity.
C. Section 4: Preventing Usurpation Through a Presumption of Presidential
Ability
Section 4 was the most vociferously debated section of the Amendment be-
cause its critics in Congress perceived in it the potential for abuse by a conniv-
ing Vice President and a disenchanted Cabinet.62 Anticipating these concerns,
the drafters of Section 4 included institutional checks on the Vice President in
Section 4 that place a heavy burden of proof on the President's challengers,
whereas in Section 3 the President bears no such burden.
Unlike Section 3, Section 4 includes several layers of external review to pre-
vent the President's political rivals from illegitimately deposing him. The re-
quirement that a majority of the President's (presumably loyal) Cabinet concur
in the Vice President's determination of presidential inability discourages the
Vice President from seizing the reins of office.6 3 Requiring a supermajority of
both houses of Congress to agree that the President is unable, when the Presi-
dent has challenged the initial diagnosis, further discourages the Vice President
and Cabinet from ousting the President.6 4 The Vice President and Cabinet
members who voted a sane President out of power during all but the most dras-
effecting a premeditated, mid-term presidential transition but acknowledging the
unlikelihood of ticket-flipping after a bruising primary campaign).
61. See Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 54 (statements of Rep. Donoghue and
Sen. Bayh); 111 CONG. REC. 3271 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("[I]f we had a
President unable to write his name, the matter would not be considered under
section 3 ... but rather it would be considered under section 4."); MILLER CEN-
TER REPORT, supra note 18, at 17o ("[Section 3] could be used, of course, only in
cases where the president remained conscious and competent at the time he
signed the letter.").
62. See infra Part IV.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; see also 111 CONG. REC. 3262-63 (1965) (state-
ment of Sen. Fong) ("It is reasonable to assume that persons the President selects
as Cabinet officers are the President's most devoted and loyal supporters who
would naturally wish his continuance as president.").
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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tic cases of inability would place themselves at risk of impeachment or political
exile if the President were to successfully challenge a fraudulent or even careless
diagnosis.6"
The prescribed timeline of its review procedure suggests that Section 4 was
designed for prolonged or indefinite periods of inability. The Amendment does
not explicitly provide a mechanism for the Vice President to return power vol-
untarily to the President who regains his ability sooner than four days after the
Vice President and Cabinet declare him unable. A rigidly textualist reading of
Section 4 seems to require both that the President declare in writing "that no
inability exists," and that four days elapse during which the Vice President and
a majority of the Cabinet have the option to declare otherwise, thereby trigger-
ing congressional review.66 The Amendment's legislative history does indicate,
however, that the President and Vice President could agree to restore the Presi-
dent to his office before the four days elapsed.67 Still, this gap in the text demon-
strates that Section 4 does not apply to short-term inabilities. The structure of
Section 4 leverages multi-layered review procedures, the long-term self-interest
of political actors, and the expectation of a four-day minimum to discourage
seizures of presidential power during minor presidential impairments.
D. The Structure of Executive Power in the Constitution
The constitutional design of the executive branch requires both that the
President enjoy broad latitude to define and diagnose his own inability under
Section 3, and that he maintain a strong presumption of ability under Section 4.
Unlike Congress and the judiciary, the President is an individual possessed of
one mind and self-knowledge. Thus, when the President passes judgment on
presidential ability he is "taking his own pulse" in a way that is impossible for
his subordinates to replicate. The executive is also unique among the branches
in being constantly "in session."68 Preserving these two features of the constitu-
tional executive, the Amendment makes it relatively easy for the President to
declare himself "unable" and cede his powers to the Vice President whenever he
65. See Il1 CONG. REC. 3284 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (claiming that the Vice
President's "political future would be ruined if he attempted to usurp the office");
id. at 7942 (statement of Rep. Poff).
66. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXV, § 4.
67. Hearing on S.I. Res. i, supra note 21, at lo (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Att'y Gen.-Designate of the United States); Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at
99-1oo (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the United States);
Ill CONG. REC. 3285 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); 111 CONG. REC. 7939-40
(1965) (statement of Rep. Celler); see also FEERICK, supra note 15, at 204 (citing
Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 99, 107, 243); 111 CONG. REC. 15,214 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Poff)); 111 CONG. REc. 3267 (1965) (statement of Sen. Dirksen)
(quoting Hearing on S.J. Res. 1, supra).
68. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 132 (2005).
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sees fit. The power Section 4 grants to the Vice President and Cabinet, by con-
trast, is an exception to the Constitution's otherwise nearly exclusive grant of
executive power to the President.6" The exceptional nature of the Vice Presi-
dent's exercise under Section 4 of that otherwise unitary power suggests that
"unable" should be construed narrowly in that section.7 0
That Section 3 empowers the President to step down temporarily whenever
he is able to do so implies that the Vice President may not use Section 4 when
the President rationally decides not to relinquish authority. For the Vice Presi-
dent to invoke Section 4 after the President has made a rational decision to re-
main in power (or before he has a chance to do so) would impermissibly substi-
tute the Vice President's judgment for the President's.
E. Prospective Inability
One of the greatest strengths of Section 3 is that it allows the President to
transfer power to the Vice President during foreseen periods of inability, and
perhaps even prospectively for unexpected yet contemplated future incidents.
Advance planning for presidential inability promotes a smooth and unques-
tioned transfer of power. All invocations of Section 3 to date have been for brief,
scheduled surgeries involving anesthetic or sedative drugs. President George W.
Bush last invoked the Amendment in 2007 with a letter to the leaders of Con-
gress stating his determination to "transfer temporarily [his] Constitutional
powers and duties to the Vice President during the brief period of the proce-
dure and recovery." 72 The declaration was arguably prospective, so that if Presi-
dent Bush had never undergone his procedure, the legal inability would never
have begun.73 The President's Office faxed the letter immediately before his sur-
gery, but there is no overwhelming constitutional reason why such a letter may
69. See Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 98 n.231 (1994) ("Nothing in the Constitution
commits any part of the executive power to the President's subordinates, except in
two cases: when Congress vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads
of departments, and [Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment].") (citing U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4, cl. 1; Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
70. See ill CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler).
71. See id. at 7941 (statement of Rep. Poff) (describing the category of impairments
covered by Section 3 as that "in which the President recognizes his inability-or
the imminence of his inability") (emphasis added).
72. Peter Baker, Growths in Bush's Colon Not Suspicious, Doctor Says, WASH. POST,
July 22, 2007, at A3.
73. President Reagan's invocation of Section 3 was also arguably prospective. See infra
note 138 and accompanying text.
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not be sent further in advance, setting the hour at which the inability would be-
gin, and perhaps, as I suggest below, even the hour at which it would end.
7 4
Some have suggested that Section 3 also be used for unplanned future in-
abilities by arrangement of the President and Vice President, outlining proce-
dures for contingent cessions of executive power.75 According to John Feerick,
"[t]he declaration could even be conditional and prospective in nature, stating,
for example: '[I] f in the event I am under anesthesia or similarly unable, I wish
you to assume those duties.'- 76 Then when the Vice President acts on the
agreement, he is merely effectuating the President's prejudgment about his own
inability-not acting unilaterally under Section 4. From the President's per-
spective, applying Section 3 prospectively may be preferable to a Section 4 dec-
laration by the Vice President and Cabinet, because, once the President recov-
ers, he can immediately regain power without approval from the Vice President
or Congress. The Vice President might prefer prospective agreements to avoid
needing the Cabinet's concurrence in a Section 4 diagnosis of presidential
inability.
Experts have recommended that each new administration craft formal con-
tingency plans before inauguration. 7 Along these lines, "secret letters of under-
standing are known to have been written by Presidents Bush and Clinton to
their vice presidents indicating their intentions for transfer of power in case of
illness." 7 To make such an agreement operative under Section 3, though, the
74. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
75. Hearing on S.1. Res. 1, supra note 21, at 20 (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Att'y Gen. of the United States); Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 97-99
(statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
76. FEERICK, supra note 15, at 198 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 99
(statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the United States)); see also
111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (stating that the President
could invoke Section 3 when he recognizes "the imminence of his inability").
77. The Working Group on Disability in U.S. Presidents recommended that "[a) for-
mal contingency plan for the implementation of the Amendment should be in
place before the inauguration of every president." PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, SU-
pra note 7, at 529. The contingency plan would "delineate those situations and
medical conditions which would normally warrant a voluntary transfer of power
under the provisions of Section 3 or an involuntary transfer of power under the
provisions of Section 4." Id.
78. Drachman et al., supra note 7, at 276. Before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Presi-
dent Eisenhower had an informal agreement with Vice President Nixon permit-
ting Nixon to act as President in the event of Eisenhower's future inability, but al-
lowing Eisenhower to resume his duties by declaring the inability ended. Press
Release, Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Proce-
dures in the Event of Presidential Disability (Mar. 3, 1958), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=u313. Similar letters were written
from President Kennedy to Vice President Johnson, and from President Johnson
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President would have to send it to the Speaker of the House and the President
pro tempore of the Senate before becoming totally disabled,79 and that trans-
mission should be public."0 Mere agreements between the President and Vice
President may be useful in subsequent diagnoses of Section 4 inability,"' but
they would not constitute presidential declarations under Section 3 unless the
President himself sends them to Congress.
The advantages of planning for future contingencies in this fashion are ob-
vious, but this situation does force the Vice President to diagnose the Presi-
dent's inability when the time comes, or at least to confirm that the President's
current condition fits within the description of inability provided in the Presi-
dent's prospective declaration. Prospective, conditional declarations risk uncer-
tainty about whether the Vice President is Acting President during an ambigu-
ous state of presidential impairment. Still, the risks of misuse are minimal, since
the President can resume his duties following the activation of a conditional
Section 3 declaration merely by announcing his ability restored."'
If Section 3 permits prospective declarations of inability, there is no reason
why prospective declarations of restored ability should not be permitted as well.
Thus it would be possible for a President to transmit a single declaration stating
that he will be unable to discharge the powers of his office during a scheduled
surgery and that he will be able again at the end of the surgery or after a speci-
fied recovery period. 3 The same document could serve as both the declaration
of inability and the declaration "to the contrary." s4 If, when the powers of office
reverted to him, the President remained totally unable to discharge them, his
to Vice President Humphrey. See ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY:
ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE WHITE HOUSE 131 (2d ed. 1998).
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
80. See S. REP. No. 89-66, in APPLICATION, supra note 20, at 2, 418 ("It is the intention
of the [Senate Judiciary C]ommittee that for the best interests of the country to be
served, notice by all parties [under Sections 3 and 4] should be public notice.").
81. But see MILLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 18, at 173 (tentatively rejecting con-
tingent pre-authorizations principally because "Section 4 provides the exclusive
means for determining a presidential inability once the president loses the capac-
ity to make that determination for himself").
82. It is clear from the text and purpose of Section 3 that the President could not be
prevented from reclaiming the powers and duties of his office by strict adherence
to his earlier prospective descriptions of restored ability.
83. See Hearing on S.]. Res. I, supra note 21, at 65 (statement of Herbert Brownell,
Att'y Gen. of the United States) (approving a declaration of the beginning and
end of Section 3 inability by a single letter); id. at 20 (statement of Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach, Att'y Gen. of the United States) (permitting a single letter as suitable
under Section 3); FEERICK, supra note 15, at 198 ("Under Section 3 a President is
permitted to declare himself disabled either for an indefinite or a specified period
of time.").
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
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subordinates could decide to invoke Section 4, but the original period of legal
inability would end as predetermined by the President's declaration.
Prospective declarations of inability would require a broad reading of the
present tense text of Section 3, which says the President must transmit a "decla-
ration that he is unable... ."'5 Prospective declarations must also overcome the
textual implication that the phrases "[w] henever the President transmits" and
"until he transmits" contemplate transmission-not the occurrence of an ex-
ternal condition-as the trigger for legal recognition of inability and restored
ability, 6 and thus foreclose the delayed fuse of a prospective declaration. This
narrow reading arguably conflicts with the President's broad powers of con-
struction under Section 3,87 and to the extent that it discourages the President
from taking present action for future contingencies, this reading may under-
mine the Amendment's purpose of promoting executive branch continuity. In
the interest of national stability, it is unlikely that a prospective declaration once
activated would be seriously challenged as long as the President's inability were
publicly confirmed. These textual ambiguities, however, may be enough to dis-
courage some Presidents from making prospective declarations under Section 3.
Prospective application of Section 4 is outside the narrow zone of construc-
tion available to the Vice President and Cabinet under Section 4 and would do
violence to the Constitution and the office of the President. Declarations of
contingent inability under Section 4 would allow the Vice President and Cabi-
net to threaten the President with ouster from office conditioned on his future
official or unofficial acts, without requiring the political commitment inherent
in a public declaration of current inability. A prospective declaration by the
Vice President and Cabinet would violate the constitutional structure that gives
the President sole control over executive power,88 and it would short circuit the
Amendment's presumption that the President is the best judge of his own in-
ability and deserves the first chance to recognize and declare it. As with short-
term and minor impairments, the structure of the Amendment in its constitu-
tional context grants the President discretion to construct presidential inability
prospectively, but it prohibits comparable constructions of the identical, vague
phrase in Section 4.
85. Id. (emphasis added); cf Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 125 (1964) (holding in a
statutory context that "the tense of the verb 'be' is not, considered alone, disposi-
tive").
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
87. See FEERICK, supra note 15, at 198 (noting that Section 3 "was intended to be
broadly interpreted"); supra Section II.B.
88. See STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
428 (2008) ("[W]hatever executive power may exist must be exercised subject to
presidential control.").
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment confirms a congres-
sional intent-in keeping with the Amendment's structure-that the Vice
President's and Cabinet's construction of presidential inability must be more
narrowly delimited than the President's construction of the same phrase. Al-
though legislative history cannot override the language and structure of the
Amendment itself,s9 statements by the Amendment's sponsors, especially Sena-
tor Bayh who sponsored the Amendment and defended it in both Houses, 9
help to elucidate this striking example of textual vagueness. This history con-
firms that the President enjoys broad discretion to invoke Section 3 during mi-
nor, short-term, and even unexplained impairments, and that his subordinates
may only apply Section 4 when the President is totally unable to decide ration-
ally whether to step down, or unable physically to communicate that decision.
Although they did not discuss the meaning of the "unable to discharge"
phrase in terms of constitutional construction, the Amendment's sponsors
sometimes spoke of "the word 'unable' as used in" one section or the other,9'
recognizing implicitly that the structure of the executive branch they were
amending and of the Amendment itself would shape the meaning of that phrase
differently in each section. Likewise, in discussing hypothetical applications of
Sections 3 and 4, sponsors referred to two distinct "categories of cases" that the
Amendment addressed. 92 This sort of deliberate distinction suggests that the
89. See il CONG. REc. 15,384 (1965) (statement of Sen. Gore) ("The Congress is asked
to adopt language .... That is what is before the Senate. Undoubtedly there have
been many conferences and colloquies, but the language should be explicit when
it becomes a part of the U.S. Constitution."). But see John 0. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 371, 371 (2007) ("[T]he expected applications can be strong
evidence of the original meaning.").
90. See ill CONG. REC. 15,384 (1965) (statement of Sen. Cooper) ("The reason I di-
rected questions to the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Bayh], was that his answers as
the Senator in charge of the bill are important in the interpretation of the
amendment.... From a legal standpoint... [t]he Senator's statements bear upon
the intent of the Senate to a greater degree than our statements would."); see also
111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that Senator
Bayh "is more responsible [for the Amendment] than anyone else").
91. Ill CONG. REC. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("IT]he word 'inability' and
the word 'unable' as used in [Section 4] ... ,which refer to an impairment of the
President's faculties, mean that he is unable to make or communicate his deci-
sions as to his own competency to execute the powers and duties of his office.")
(emphasis added); see also ill CONG. REc. 7943 (1965) (statement of Rep. Horton)
(making "a clear distinction between disability of the President declared by him-
self and a disability involuntarily established as provided for in section 4").
92. Ill CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff); see Ill CONG. REC. 7938 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Celler) ("[Sjection 4, as distinguished from section 3. This is a
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framers of the Amendment intended "unable to discharge the powers and du-
ties of his office" to apply to a different set of conditions in each section.
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment opted against a specific con-
stitutional definition of the "unable to discharge" phrase in either section. Un-
derstanding that it would be impossible to anticipate all the possible forms of
presidential inability, the drafters chose a more flexible inability provision that
the relevant constitutional actors could apply in all appropriate cases.93 Never-
theless, the legislative record of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment reveals important
differences in meaning between the twin inability provisions in terms of the se-
verity and duration of the presidential impairments covered in each section.
A. Severity of Inability
As members of Congress debated the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, they de-
scribed different categories of inability that could implicate Section 3 and Sec-
tion 4. The Amendment's sponsors emphasized that under Section 3, the Presi-
dent may choose to step down even for relatively minor inabilities. During the
House hearings, former Attorney General Brownell, who chaired the American
Bar Association (ABA) committee that drafted an early blueprint of the
Amendment, gave a representative description of the expected applications of
Section 3:
A typical situation that is covered by this section is one in which the
President is physically ill and his doctors recommend temporary sus-
pension of his normal governmental activities, to facilitate his recovery.
Other situations that have been visualized are those where the Presi-
dent might be going to have an operation, or where he was going
abroad and might be out of reliable communication with the White
House for a short period.94
Congressmen mentioned each of these situations-illness, 9 surgery,96 and in-
ternational travel 9 7-- repeatedly as possible occasions for invoking Section 3. In
situation where the President is unwilling or unable to declare his inability.")
(emphasis added).
93. See ill CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) ("It was decided that it
would be unwise to attempt such a definition [of 'inability' in Section 4] within
the framework of the Constitution. To do so would give the definition adopted a
rigidity which, in application, might sometimes be unrealistic."); id. at 7938
(statement of Rep. Celler).
94. Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 240 (statement of Herbert Brownell,
Chairman of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Presidential
Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy) (emphasis added).
95. See 11 CONG. REC. 3265 (1965)(statement of Sen. Carlson); id. at 7956 (statement
of Rep. Randall).
96. See id. at 7941 (statement of Rep. Poff).
97. See id. at 7947 (statement of Rep. McClory).
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each case the President would be justified in declaring himself unable, though
the Amendment would not require it.
None of these situations, however, would constitute inability under Section
4, because that section was intended to remedy a more extreme set of condi-
tions. Congressman Poff gave examples of the limited circumstances in which
application of Section 4 would be appropriate:
One is the case when the President by reason of some physical ailment
or some sudden accident is unconscious or paralyzed and therefore
unable to make or to communicate the decision to relinquish the pow-
ers of his Office. The other is the case when the President, by reason of
mental debility, is unable or unwilling to make any rational decision,
including particularly the decision to stand aside.9s
The legislative record reveals that only severe disabilities-whether physical, 99
mental,10 ° or as a result of capture' 0-that render the President totally unable to
communicate a rational decision comprised the expected applications of Sec-
tion 4.
Members of Congress restricted Section 4 to severe cases of inability, with
increasing rigor and specificity leading up to the Amendment's adoption. On
the day that S.J. Res. 1 passed the Senate and before it went to conference, Sena-
tor Bayh provided the following strict, if somewhat circular, definition of inabil-
ity: "[T]he word 'inability' and the word 'unable' as used in [Section 4]...
mean that [the President] is unable either to make or communicate his deci-
sions as to his own competency to execute the powers and duties of his of-
fice."' This definition came as a "clarification" of Senator Bayh's earlier, more
expansive statement that "the intention of this legislation is to deal with any
type of inability, whether it is from traveling from one nation to another, a
breakdown of communications, capture by the enemy, or anything that is imag-
inable."'0 3 The earlier statement is true of Sections 3 and 4 considered together
but misleading as applied to Section 4 alone. Senator Bayh's subsequent defini-
98. 111 CONG. REc. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff); see also id. at 7938 (statement
of Rep. Celler) ("This is a situation where the President is unwilling or unable to
declare his inability."); id. at 3265 (statement of Sen. Carlson); FEERICK, supra
note 15, at 200.
99. See Inl CONG. REc. 7947 (1965)(statement of Rep. McClory); id. at 7941 (statement
of Rep. Poff); id. at 7938 (statement of Rep. Celler).
loo. See id. at 15,593 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 7947 (statement of Rep. McClory);
id. at 7941 (statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 7938 (statement of Rep. Celler).
iol. See Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 141.
102. 111 CONG. REC. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Representative Poff offered a
similar definition in the House debate on April 13, 1965. Ill CONG. REc. 7941 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Pof.
103. Hearing on S.1. Res. 1, supra note 21, at 20 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (emphasis
added), quoted in Ill CONG. REc. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
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tion was suggested to him off the record by Senator Robert Kennedy,1 4 whose
support Senator Bayh saw as critical for the Amendment's success." 5 The defi-
nition suggests, as previously argued from constitutional structure,' °6 that Sec-
tion 4 is available only where the application of Section 3 is impossible. Imme-
diately before it passed the Senate, Senator Hruska indicated his support for S.J.
Res. i but warned that "caution and restraint will be demanded should this in-
ability measure be called into application."'0 7 The senators recognized that the
flexibility of meaning that is an asset in Section 3 would be a terrible liability in
Section 4.
One week before Congress passed the recommended Amendment in its fi-
nal form, Senator Kennedy engaged Senator Bayh in a colloquy in which the
latter agreed that the inability phrase in Section 4 means "total disability to per-
form the powers and duties of office." 'n s Total inability in the President may
take the form of either "physical or mental inability to make or communicate
his decision regarding his capacity" or "physical or mental inability to exercise
the powers and duties of his office."'0 9 The purpose of enunciating such a high
standard for inability under Section 4 was to prevent a broad reading whereby
"when a President makes an unpopular decision, he would immediately be ren-
dered unable to perform the duties of his office.""0 Members of Congress voted
for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment with the understanding that Section 4 applied
only to states of total inability in which the President would be unable to step
down of his own volition.
Although no congressman explicitly stated that Section 3 inability is mutu-
ally exclusive of Section 4 inability, that principle is evident from the hypotheti-
cal examples of each type offered in debate. Short-term surgery, for example,
was the paradigm case of Section 3 inability,"' but Senator Bayh explicitly re-
jected it as a basis for invoking Section 4.12 Conversely, the President would be
104. BAYH, supra note 12, at 271.
105. Id. at 256. Kennedy was concerned that an expansive definition of inability could
give rise to a coup, especially when, as in his brother's administration, the Presi-
dent may not personally know members of his Cabinet. Id. at 263.
lO6. See supra Part II.
107. 111 CONG. REC. 3285 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
108. 111 CONG. REC. 15,381 (1965) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (emphasis added).
lo9. Id.
no. Id.
111. See supra notes 94, 96, and accompanying text. Indeed, all three applications of
Section 3 to date have been for planned minor medical procedures. See infra Sec-
tion W.A.
112. 111 CONG. REc. 15,381 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (insisting that in Section 4
"[wle are not talking about the kind of inability in which the President went to
the dentist and was under anesthesia").
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unable to invoke Section 3 were he paralyzed by a sudden accident,'13 but Sec-
tion 4 was designed to address precisely this sort of impairment.1 4 To prevent
misuse of Section 4, congressmen described conditions that would not qualify
as inability under that section. "[Ilt was made clear that unpopularity, incom-
petence, impeachable conduct, poor judgment, and laziness do not constitute
an 'inability' within the meaning of [Section 4]. ' '1 s It seems equally clear, how-
ever, that under Section 3 a President could declare his own inability based on
loss of public confidence, incompetence, or even mildly impaired judgment, be-
cause he need not justify his declaration of inability at all." 6 These hypothetical
inabilities suggest that the senators and representatives who voted to adopt the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment understood that the "unable to discharge" phrases
would apply to entirely different classes of impairment in each section, and that
only total disability would qualify under Section 4.
B. Duration of Inability
The question of how long a presidential disability must persist before war-
ranting a vice-presidential seizure of power predated the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, and it remains a matter for constitutional construction."7 The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment imperfectly addresses the problem, and discretion is
necessary under both sections. Nevertheless, the legislative history demonstrates
that the framers generally expected Section 3 to apply most often to short-term
disabilities, especially medical operations, while Section 4, on the other hand,
generally contemplates longer periods of presidential inability.
The Amendment's sponsors stopped short of declaring that Section 4
would only apply to prolonged inabilities. When Senator Kennedy asked Sena-
113. See supra note 61.
114. See supra notes 61, 98-99.
115. FEERICK, supra note 15, at 202 (citing 111 CONG. REc. 3282-83 (1965) (statement of
Sen. Hart)); see also Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice Presi-
dent: Hearings on S.1. Res. 139 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 25 (1964) [hereinafter
Hearing on S.1. Res. 139] (statement of Sen. Keating); 111 CONG. REC. 3282-83 (1965)
(statement of Sen. Bayh) ("[W]e are not dealing with... [a] decision.., which
might render the President unpopular. We are talking about a President who is
unable to perform the powers and duties of his office."); id. at 15,386 (statement of
Sen. Bayh).
116. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
117. Chester Arthur succeeded to the presidency upon the death of President Garfield,
after waiting eighty days while Garfield lay on his deathbed. Vice President Arthur
asked Congress about the Article II inability provision on December 6, 1881: "Is
the inability limited in its nature to long-continued intellectual incapacity, or has
it a broader import? What must be its extent and duration?" 8 J. RICHARDSON, A
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tor Bayh: "Is it not true that the inability referred to [in Section 41 must be ex-
pected to be of long duration or at least one whose duration is uncertain and
might persist?",.. Senator Bayh did not rule out the possibility of invoking Sec-
tion 4 during a short-term inability in a national crisis, but he acknowledged
that short-term application of Section 4 would rarely be appropriate:
A President who was unconscious for 30 minutes when missiles
were flying toward this country might only be disabled temporarily,
but it would be of severe consequence when viewed in the light of the
problems facing the country.
So at that time, even for that short duration, someone would have
to make a decision. But a disability which has persisted for only a short
time would ordinarily be excluded. If a President were unable to make
an Executive decision which might have severe consequences for the
country, I think we would be better off under the conditions of the
amendment." 9
Senators frequently raised the scenario of a severe disability afflicting the
President during an international emergency as one appropriate for Section 4.2 °
The recurring hypothetical suggests that context is critical in the decision to
remove the President involuntarily for an impairment that is likely to be brief.
Responsible evaluation of presidential inability under Section 4 must weigh the
form, severity, and duration of that inability in relation to the exigencies of na-
tional and international affairs. The same symptoms that merit invocation of
Section 4 in an emergency may not under normal circumstances. By contrast,
transitory disabilities in peacetime were the core expected applications of Sec-
tion 3.121 While leaving room for exigencies, the legislative history supports the
Amendment's structure by encouraging short-term applications of Section 3'
and generally disapproving short-term applications of Section 4." 3
C. Vagueness and Textual Preservation
If Sections 3 and 4 require their constitutional actors to construe presiden-
tial inability so differently, why did the drafters use the same phrase in both?
The phrase "unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office" was not
118. 111 CONG. REC. 15,381 (1965) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
119. Id. (statement of Sen. Bayh) (emphasis added).
120. Ill CONG. REc. 15,593 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 3271 (statement of Sen.
Bayh); id. at 3265 (statement of Sen. Carlson).
121. See supra note 94.
122. See supra Section II.B.
123. See supra Section II.C.
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fashioned ex nihilo.' 4 Instead the Amendment's authors looked to the constitu-
tional text they were amending: Article II provided for the Vice President's ac-
cession to the office of President in the case of the President's "[ilnability to dis-
charge the Powers and Duties of the said Office."'' 5 The legislative history
reveals a reluctance to put "additional language in the Constitution that has no
precedent." '' ' 6 The drafters tried to remain as faithful as possible to the pre-
existing language of the Constitution even while remedying its dangerously in-
complete solution to the problem of presidential inability.
This textual conservatism resulted in unnecessary ambiguity in at least one
other phrase. To refer to the Cabinet, the Amendment adopted the phrase "the
principal officers of the executive departments" ' with all the attendant ambi-
guity" 8 and capacity for evolution 9 inherent in that language, simply because a
similar phrase appears in Article II, 1' ° and "Cabinet" does not appear in the
Constitution."' The sponsors retained their "principal officers" phrase over
124. The phrase remained unchanged from the Amendment's first draft. S.J. Res. 139,
88th Cong. (1963). That draft adapted a similar phrase from an earlier proposed
amendment: "inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of the
said office." S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong. (1963); FEERICK, supra note 15, at 56 n.t.
125. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
126. Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 60 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
128. See Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 52 (statement of Rep. Whitener) (sug-
gesting that the Secretary of the Navy is the principal officer of an executive de-
partment); id. at 61 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (suggesting that the head of
the Atomic Energy Commission is the principal officer of an executive depart-
ment).
129. Senator Bayh agreed with Representative Rogers that, "[i]f in the future we should
create an office of Cabinet of Humanities as an example ... , [he] would be a
member of the Cabinet who would be in a position to act." Hearings on H.R. 836,
supra note 38, at 55 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating
to the Duties of their respective Offices... .") (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 89-
66, supra note 20, at 2418 (explaining that "principal officers" refers to the Cabi-
net, and citing the corresponding language in Article II).
131. See il CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) ("We name them execu-
tive departments rather than Cabinet for safety's sake, because the word 'Cabinet'
is never used in the Constitution."); Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 40
(statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 60 (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("The reason [the
'principal officers' language] was put in [the Amendment is that] the word 'Cabi-
net' was not used in the Constitution. The words 'members of the executive de-
partment' are."); id. at 53.
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numerous objections,'32 to import "the general interpretation put on [the origi-
nal] language" into the new context of presidential succession,'33 even at the
cost of textual clarity.
This desire to retain pre-existing constitutional verbiage and to avoid lin-
guistic innovation may explain why-again adapting language from Article II-
the authors of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment used the same phrase in both sec-
tions even though each necessarily addresses different types of inability. Rather
than reinvent the wheel, the drafters borrowed familiar language from the 1787
Constitution to convey related-though not identical-meanings in Sections 3
and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
IV. APPLICATION HISTORY
The application history of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment confirms the dis-
tinction between inability under Sections 3 and 4 demonstrated by the structure
and legislative history of the Amendment. All three invocations of Section 3 to
date have been for non-emergency elective surgery, occasions which would not
justify a declaration of presidential inability under Section 4. 34 While some
scholars have suggested using the Amendment to remove a President temporar-
ily during impeachment or criminal proceedings, no constitutional actor has
done so, and invoking Section 4 on such an occasion would violate the
Amendment's structure and legislative history.
A. Application of Section 3: Elective Surgery
The White House and the American public have gradually warmed to the
idea of the President voluntarily relinquishing power for a brief time. President
Reagan's initial, ambivalent invocation of Section 3 has been rectified by two
more confident applications that firmly fixed short-term, non-emergency sur-
geries at the core of an ongoing construction of Section 3 inability.
On July 13, 1985, President Reagan first made use of Section 3135-though
disclaiming its application-for eight hours during and after surgery to remove
a cancerous polyp from his colon." 6 He signed a letter to the leaders of Con-
gress that purported not to make use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment because
of "the uncertainties of its application to such brief and temporary periods of
132. Questions about this phrase recurred throughout the hearing. See Hearings on
H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 52-53, 55-56, 58-61, 68.
133. Hearings on H.R. 836, supra note 38, at 52 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
134. See ill CONG. REC. 15,381 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
135. An unattributed comment notes that when President Carter was undergoing mi-
nor surgery, "[tihey had the Twenty-fifth Amendment ready." Bayh, History and
Meaning, supra note 34, at 41. But no President invoked the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment before President Reagan. Id.; FEERICK, supra note 15, at xv.
136. FEERICK, supra note 15, at xv.
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incapacity,"'3 7 yet he followed its procedures in directing "Vice President
George Bush [to] discharge those powers and duties in [his] stead commencing
with the administration of anesthesia to [him] in this instance."'' 8 Five hours
after his surgery was completed, President Reagan signed a two-sentence letter
declaring himself "able to resume the discharge of [his] powers and duties."'3 9
Yet even this letter was ambiguous about its own efficacy, implying that the
President already had resumed power independent of his second declaration.14
Despite Reagan's claim not to have used Section 3, this event was clearly its first
application . 41 President Reagan later acknowledged as much,' 42 and Fred Field-
ing, who drafted the letter, described it as "a piece that would accomplish the
activation of the 25th Amendment, but was more consistent with what [he] per-
ceived to be the President's concerns."' 143
President George W. Bush invoked Section 3 on July 29, 2002-the first
forthright invocation of the temporary inability provision-for two hours and
fifteen minutes during and after a twenty-minute colorectal screening.' 4 The
President transmitted two separate letters, one initiating the inability period'45
and the other terminating it,'146 by fax to the leaders of Congress. 47 President
137. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 2 PUB. PAPERS 919 (July 13,
1985) ("I do not believe that the drafters of this Amendment intended its applica-
tion to situations such as the instant one.").
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 919-2o (stating that he had already "informed the Vice President of [his] de-
termination and [his] resumption of those powers and duties."). Cf U.S. CONST.
amend XXV, § 3 ("[U] ntil [the President] transmits.., a written declaration to
the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.").
141. See FEERICK, supra note 15, at xvi; Birch Bayh, Reflections on the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment as We Enter a New Century, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 21, at 55,
59 ("[F] rom a constitutional perspective, the only basis for the president's action
was, in fact, Section 3.").
142. RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 500 (1990) ("Before
they wheeled me into the operating room, I signed a letter invoking the Twenty-
fifth Amendment, making George Bush acting president .....
143. MILLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 18, at 166.
144. Mike Allen, Bush Resumes Power After Test; President's Routine Colon Exam
Showed No Abnormalities, WASH. POST, June 30, 2002, at A13.
145. Letter from President George W. Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives, I PUB. PAPERS 1083 (June 29, 2002).
146. Letter from President George W. Bush to the President Pro Tempore of the Sen-
ate, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1084 (June 29, 2002).
147. Allen, supra note 144.
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Bush had announced his decision to invoke Section 3 one day in advance of the
operation. ' During the declared inability, Acting President Cheney took "no
recorded actions."1 49 As if in response to Reagan's fears about setting dangerous
precedent, Bush's staff emphasized that no future President would be bound to
invoke Section 3 in a similar situation. 5° His action was completely discretion-
ary and was based on the relevant circumstances-the nature of the procedure,
national and international threats, and his trust in the Vice President.15' Never-
theless, the example of a smooth and temporary transition of power paved the
way for future applications of Section 3.
The third and most recent invocation of Section 3 seemed almost routine in
comparison to Reagan's faltering first use. On July 21, 2007, President George
W. Bush transferred power to Vice President Cheney for two hours and five
minutes while having benign polyps removed from his large intestine. 2 The
surgery itself lasted just thirty-one minutes.'" The period of inability was initi-
ated by one letter 5 4 and terminated by another."' During the operation, the
President was anesthetized with a sedative that "wears off considerably faster
than the standard agents."' 6 The President was awake three minutes after doc-
tors stopped administering the drug' 7 and suffered no major post-operative
effects on his faculties.' 8 Under sedation, the President was in a state similar to
natural sleep, and presumably he could have been awakened prematurely in the
event of a crisis. During the declared inability, Acting President Cheney re-
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. ("'I don't think that you can glean from this that every time there will be a mi-
nor or even a more serious procedure, that the president is going to invoke Sec-
tion 3,' [White House Counsel Alberto] Gonzales said.").
151. Id.




154. Letter from President George W. Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 43 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc.
1003 (July 21, 2007).
155. Letter from President George W. Bush to the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 43 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc.
1004 (July 21, 2007) ("With the transmittal of this letter, I am resuming those
powers and duties effective immediately.").
156. Riechmann, supra note 152.
157. Baker, supra note 72.
158. Id.
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mained at his home,'1 9 writing a letter to his grandchildren.16 The two most re-
cent applications received scant attention in the press.
Section 3 has proven well-suited to such short-term inabilities. The type
and extent of presidential inability in each of these cases was relatively minor,
yet no one questioned the reasonableness of the Presidents' decisions to invoke
Section 3. Scholars have criticized President Reagan, not for invoking Section 3,
but for disingenuously disclaiming its applicability. 6 ' President Bush was
praised for planning with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in mind, 62 and for in-
voking it. 6' His example will encourage future Presidents to consider declaring
inability during brief impairments, thereby promoting executive continuity.'6 4
While setting an example of liberal invocation of Section 3, President Bush
avoided binding himself or his successors to that precedent. The polyps re-
moved from Bush's colon in 2007 had been found earlier during a "routine"
screening 6 ' that had not prompted another invocation of Section 3, but the
failure to cede power during that screening received no attention. Apparently
the public accepted the White House's admonition after the 2002 screening that
one invocation of Section 3 does not require future invocations for similar pro-
cedures. 66 Whether that precedent will be misinterpreted as an invitation to
apply Section 4 in similar circumstances is a separate question with even higher
stakes. Between 1985 and 2007, the attitude of the presidency toward Section 3
shifted from perceiving it as a threat to presidential power to embracing it as a
tool for executive continuity. But unless a properly nuanced conception of the
two classes of presidential inability replaces the univocal understanding, that
progress also increases the risk that Section 4 will be used to remove a President
who is not totally unable.
159. Riechmann, supra note 152.
16o. What (Acting) President Cheney Did, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 6, 2007, at 4.
161. By failing explicitly to invoke Section 4 when President Reagan was shot in 1981
and Section 3 when he underwent surgery in 1987, the administration missed "op-
portunities ... to demonstrate to the world that the United States could function
responsibly even though the president was disabled .... " Bayh, supra note 141, at
59.
162. See FEERICK, supra note 15, at xxvi ("By adopting specific guidelines, the Bush
Administration properly recognized the need to prepare for cases of presidential
inability. This is a healthy precedent for future Presidents.").
163. Allen, supra note 144 ("'There's so much uncertainty on every level, so why not do
the incredibly prudent thing?' a senior official said.").
164. See FEERICK, supra note 15, at xxvi ("It is to be hoped that in the future the
Amendment will not be treated as an unusual solution to unusual circum-
stances."); MILLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 18, at 147, 168-71. But see sources
cited supra note 28 (discouraging routine invocations of Section 3).
165. Riechmann, supra note 152.
166. Allen, supra note 144.
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B. Inability During Impeachment or Criminal Proceedings
As important as the applications of Section 3 are for confirming the broad
construction of that provision, some of the occasions on which neither section
was applied are equally revealing. During two presidential scandals, scholars
suggested Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as means by which
an embattled President could temporarily step aside during impeachment pro-
ceedings. On neither occasion did the chief executive take the suggestion to in-
voke Section 3, and both situations resolved without even a rumor that the Vice
President or Cabinet considered declaring presidential inability under Section
4167
As Watergate evidence piled up against President Nixon and Vice President
Agnew, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford suggested that public loss of
confidence in Nixon rendered the executive branch ineffectual. 16' After Agnew
resigned and Vice President Ford had been confirmed, White House insiders
prepared for Nixon to invoke Section 3 and temporarily relinquish power to
Ford during the investigation.'69 John Feerick, a lawyer instrumental in drafting
the Amendment,1 70 notes that Section 3 "offered [Nixon] an opportunity to step
aside temporarily during an impeachment inquiry. In fact, several members of
Congress... suggested that he consider standing aside under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment on the ground that he was unable to discharge the duties of his of-
fice because of the constitutional controversies attending Watergate."' 7 Nixon
called this a "fatuous suggestion '' 72 and apparently never seriously considered
invoking Section 3. During another presidential scandal, Akhil Amar suggested
that invoking Section 3 during his impeachment trial would have offered Presi-
167. But see BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 325 (1976) (report-
ing that some of Nixon's advisors advocated this possibility).
168. Clark Clifford, A Government of National Unity, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1973, at 35. In
addition to public loss of confidence, Watergate took a toll on Nixon's mental
health. Before Agnew's resignation, Attorney General Elliot Richardson reportedly
expressed worry that Nixon was "not in the best psychological condition." James
M. Naughton, How Agnew Bartered His Office To Keep from Going to Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1973, at i.
169. "[D]uring Watergate, lawyers for both the White House and the Special Prosecu-
tor planned for the possibility of President Nixon making use of Section 3 if he
wished to step aside temporarily while fighting legal battles." Eric M. Freedman,
On Protecting Accountability, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 677, 710 (1999) (citing WOOD-
WARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 167, at 325).
170. See supra note 12.
171. FEERICK, supra note 15, at 155; see also John D. Feerick, The Way of the 25 th, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1973, at 47; C. Dickerman Williams, An Alternative: Taking the
Twenty-Fifth, NAT'L REV., Apr. 26, 1974, at 476-77.
172. James J. Kilpatrick, Private Talk with Nixon, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 1974, at 1.
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dent Clinton "recovery of his honor and a shot at redemption."17 3 Although nei-
ther President accepted the invitation, these events revealed a consensus that
Section 3 is broad enough to allow a President to cede power and dedicate him-
self to his own defense in an impeachment proceeding, or even to concede that
the loss of his popular mandate rendered him ineffectual. Such a use would
conform to the President's broad, unreviewable discretion under Section 3.174
More controversially, some have suggested that Section 4 might "au-
thoriz[e] a Vice President and Cabinet to suspend, so to speak, a President dur-
ing the period of an impeachment trial" or proceedings before Congress.' 75 Oth-
ers have similarly suggested that Section 4 could be used to remove a President
from power during criminal proceedings 176 or imprisonment.'7 7 However, the
structure and legislative history of the Amendment reveal a more limited scope
for Section 4 inability.'78 Impeachment does not render a President totally un-
173. Akhil Reed Amar, Take Five, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 8, 1999, at 15. But see Gilbert,
supra note 28, at 47 (noting that Clinton did well to refrain from stepping down
and instead strengthened his position by "retain[ing] and us[ing] the prestige of
his office as well as its powers-delivering a State of the Union Address, propos-
ing new laws to Congress, traveling abroad on diplomatic missions, ordering air
strikes against Iraq-to successfully mobilize the support of the public and his
party behind him").
174. See supra Section II.B. Gilbert assumes this is constitutional, but says it "typically
should be avoided by a politically astute leader." Gilbert, supra note 28, at 47.
Feerick considers it a "debatable question" "[w]hether Section 3 is broad enough
to cover the case of a President's deciding to step aside temporarily ... to devote
his full time to his defense against impeachment and removal." FEERICK, supra
note 15, at 198.
175. FEERICK, supra note 15, at xxxv; see also WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 167,
at 215-16 (recounting that some of Nixon's advisors thought it would be appropri-
ate to invoke Section 4 in the days before his resignation).
176. See Freedman, supra note 169, at 711-12 ("Section 4 could prove equally valuable if
an incumbent President were to be indicted. There could, for example, be a form
of plea bargain, under which the President, rather than be impeached, agreed not
to contest a Section 4 suspension from office during the pendency of criminal
proceedings. But even without the President's consent, the use of Section 4 to ac-
complish such a suspension would be perfectly appropriate, and might under
some circumstances be preferable to impeachment.") (citation omitted). But see
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, 1o8 HARv. L. REv. 701, 714 (1995). This question of Sec-
tion 4 removal during criminal proceedings may be academic, because the struc-
ture of the constitutional presidency suggests that a sitting President enjoys tem-
porary criminal immunity. See Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential
Privilege Against Prosecution, 2 NExus 11 (1997).
177. See Daniel E. Troy, When To Indict a President, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at A15
("Section 4... could also be used to address the remote possibility that a sitting
president, sentenced to prison, would refuse to give up the office.").
178. See supra Section II.C; supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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able to govern, as President Clinton demonstrated after he was impeached, 79 so
Section 4 has no application where an impeached President rationally decides to
remain in office while defending against conviction. Even if a President were
serving a jail sentence or bedridden, he might retain the ability to govern if he
could communicate with his staff. Only Section 3 would allow such a broad
standard of inability because in Section 3 the President alone judges his own
ability.
V. PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND THE LIMITS OF INTRATEXTUALISM
The difference in meaning, required by structure and confirmed by history,
between the "unable to discharge" phrase in Section 3 and the same phrase in
Section 4 rebuts a strong presumption that like phrases in the same legal docu-
ment should be read alike."' Akhil Amar coined the term "intratextualism" to
describe the holistic interpretive practice that seeks out similar words and
phrases in separate parts of the constitutional text and presumes that a phrase's
meaning in one place is consistent with its meaning in another. 8' One can think
of intratextualism as the constitutional version of the canon that a word is pre-
sumed to have the same meaning throughout a statute. The inability provisions
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment help define some limitations of intratextual-
ism. As with the statutory canon,s2 intratextualism is a rebuttable presumption,
not an inflexible rule. Amar himself acknowledges that similar words and
phrases in the Constitution sometimes carry dissimilar meanings.' s3 The presi-
179. See supra note 173.
18o. See generally Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) ("The first ten
amendments and the original Constitution were substantially contemporaneous
and should be construed in pari materia. So construed, the latter provision fairly
may be regarded as reflecting the meaning of the former. In other words, the two
provisions [the right to trial by jury in Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth Amend-
ment] mean substantially the same thing.").
181. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
182. In Karl Llewellyn's famous list of dueling canons of statutory construction, the
canon that "the same language used repeatedly in the same connection is pre-
sumed to bear the same meaning throughout the statute," is parried by the
counter-canon that "[t] his presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary
to assign different meanings to make the statute consistent." Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are To Be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 404 (195o). As in the statutory
context, a "good sense of the situation" is necessary to avoid mechanical applica-
tion of the intratextualist presumption in the Constitution. See id. at 401; infra
note 183.
183. See Amar, supra note 181, at 799 ("As is apparent when we consult ordinary dic-
tionaries, the same words sometimes sensibly mean different things in different
contexts.... [Intratextualism can become a mechanical exercise that blunts good
judgment and leads to outlandish outcomes. Given that sensible use of intratextu-
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dential inability provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment offer a striking ex-
ample of this phenomenon.
It is surprising that these two instances of the phrase "unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office" would not share a single meaning, because
the length, level of detail, proximity, s 4 common purpose,' and perfect textual
overlap of the two phrases,"6 and their shared reflection and modification of
the presidential succession provision in Article 1117 are all factors that would
ordinarily support the intratextualist presumption. The intratextualist pre-
sumes, in what Amar labels "Intratextualism as Principle-Interpolation," that
two phrases as closely related as the presidential inability standards in Sections 3
and 4 should be read in pari materia. This strong presumption applies where
"we are dealing not merely with a recurring word, or even a recurring word-
cluster, but with a complete, carefully elaborated command that appears in identi-
cal language.. ",lS If the presumption of "Intratextualism as Principle-
alism will require us to consider the limits of the technique, the technique will not
so much dictate results as suggest possible readings.").
184. The intratextualist presumption is intuitively stronger within shorter passages
where the drafters could not help but be aware of the relationships between
neighboring words. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2336
(2007) (noting that two statutory provisions that "are adjacent and have remarka-
bly similar structures" "can be understood only with reference to" each other);
Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasen-
tence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2003) ("As a matter of conventional
English usage, it seems far more likely that a word or phrase has the same mean-
ing throughout a single clause or sentence than that a word or phrase used in two
or more different contexts in a document has the same meaning in each con-
text."); see also Amar, supra note 181, at 796 ("Even if adjoining clauses have no
linguistic overlap, they often deal with related subjects, and each is often illumi-
nated by careful comparison with its neighbors.").
185. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 1O5 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1178-79 (1992) ("[N]o one has
argued for different interpretative approaches to the same word ['vested'] when it
appears in analogous clauses [the Vesting Clauses] of both Article II and Article
III, and for good reason-such an argument cannot be sustained.") (footnotes
omitted).
186. See Amar, supra note 18o, at 762 ("From [a] difference of phraseology, perhaps, a
difference of constitutional intention may, with propriety, be inferred.").
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added); see also supra Section III.C.
188. Amar, supra note 181, at 794-95 (emphasis added). Notably, "Intratextualism as
Principle-Interpolation" does apply to the three identical inability phrases within
Section 4, because there are no "sound constitutional reasons not to treat the in-
dividual commands as in pari materia." Id. at 795. Structure and history support
the intratextualist presumption within Section 4: Since Congress is merely affirm-
ing a diagnosis already made by the Vice President and Cabinet, both sets of con-
stitutional actors within Section 4 must apply identical standards of presidential
inability. See generally Part II.
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Interpolation" ever holds true, one might think it should apply to the identical
instances of the "unable to discharge" phrases in adjoining sentences of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Instead, recognition of the intratextual relationship
between the twin Presidential Inability Clauses highlights the important struc-
tural differences between them. Generally, "intratextual argument works best
when it coheres with other types of constitutional argument and is part of a lar-
ger constitutional vision,"8 9 but in this instance the intratextualist presumption
conflicts with a structural vision. Here, large-scale constitutional structure-not
only of the Amendment but of the executive branch generally-trumps the
phrase-level insights of intratextualism, constraining in different ways the range
of viable constructions of each identical inability provision.1 9
While it is prudent to begin with the presumption that identical phrases are
subject to the same construction, this presumption can and should be overruled
by powerful structural and historical evidence to the contrary. '9' The structure,
legislative history, and application history of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment de-
mand a more nuanced approach to presidential inability.
CONCLUSION
What should be done to protect the office of the President from others'
misuse of Section 4 while still encouraging him to invoke Section 3? The most
drastic approach would be a new constitutional amendment. A clarifying
amendment could replace the inability phrase in Section 3 with something like
"unable or unwilling to discharge the powers and duties of his office" or "im-
peded in the exercise of the powers and duties of his office."' 92 Or, the revision
could add "totally" before the inability provision in Section 4. Either change
would make textually apparent the distinction that is already required by struc-
ture and history. But trying to amend the Constitution is unnecessary and
probably counterproductive. Such an amendment would be unlikely to pass,193
189. Amar, supra note 181, at 776.
19o. See supra Part II.
191. "Because such a metacommand clause [telling us to construe parallel commands
in parallel fashion] does not in fact exist, this form of interpolation must remain
open to the possibility that, upon reflection, there are sound constitutional rea-
sons not to treat the individual commands as in pari materia." Amar, supra note
181, at 795; see also Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and
Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 736 (2000)
("While weak intratextualism is usually inoffensive, its use should always be ac-
companied by a candid assessment of its liabilities.").
192. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. V, § 6(c) ("Whenever the Governor determines that he
may be seriously impeded in the exercise of his powers, he shall so notify the Sec-
retary of State and the officer next in line of succession.").
193. First, an amendment that changes an existing constitutional process in such a
small way would be unlikely to garner the broad popular support that Article V
demands. Second, the Article V process allows "Congress to obstruct institutional
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and its failure might suggest-incorrectly-that the "unable to discharge"
phrases are equivalent as they exist now.
Legislation would be a more realistic means of concretizing the Amend-
ment's distinct categories of presidential inability, though like a constitutional
amendment, clarifying legislation could be unpopular if Congress perceived it
as constraining congressional power under Section 4.194 If Congress ever decides
to nominate some "other body" to replace the Cabinet in evaluating presiden-
tial inability, 95 Congress could use that opportunity to clarify that past and fu-
ture applications of Section 3 have no bearing on the appropriateness of Section
4 determinations. Legislation could reinforce the legislative history of the
Amendment and the structure of the executive branch by specifying that the
Vice President and the "other body" should consider resorting to Section 4 only
when the President is "unable to make or communicate" a rational decision
whether to invoke Section 3.196
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the U.S. Department of Justice
should take up the matter and issue a public opinion distinguishing presidential
inability under Section 3 from its parallel in Section 4. This is superior to the
legislative approach because it is more likely to succeed, and the OLC is
uniquely positioned to guide executive branch constitutional construction. The
opinion should explain that the President enjoys broad discretion in construct-
ing Section 3 inability but that his subordinates may only declare the President
"unable" when he is totally unable to make or communicate his own rational
decision whether to step down. Issuing the opinion early in a new administra-
tion would deflect suspicion about illness or distrust in the White House.
Unlike secret agreements between Presidents and Vice Presidents,1 97 a public
OLC opinion would guard against usurpation by providing a public standard
by which voters would scrutinize future Vice Presidents and Cabinet members
who declared the President "unable." It would also provide a starting point for
congressional evaluation of any invocation of Section 4, should the President
appeal it. Perhaps most importantly, an OLC opinion that clearly distinguished
between Section 3 inability and Section 4 inability would facilitate smooth and
frequent transfers of power under Section 3 without risking an unconstitutional
expansion of Section 4 inability.
The prevailing confusion about how to construe the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment's Inability Clauses can be remedied if Congress and the executive
reforms that threaten the inherent interests of its sitting members." Kris W. Ko-
bach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth
Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1976 (1994). Insofar as Section 4 expanded con-
gressional power by giving Congress an adjudicatory role in executive branch
power struggles, a clarifying amendment would necessarily limit that role.
194. See id.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
196. See in CONG. REC. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
197. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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branch commit themselves to detaching their construction of Section 4 from
the President's more expansive construction of Section 3. Coming to grips with
this unusual contravention of the intratextualist presumption will advance both
purposes of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The President will be encouraged to
transfer power to the Vice President any time his ability to govern may be di-
minished, and the President will act without fear that his voluntary invocation
of the Amendment will be used against him or his successors. Continued
equivocation endangers the Oval Office. "Let us stop playing Presidential in-
ability roulette."'' 8
198. 111 CONG. REc. 7936 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler).
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